It doesn’t seem so to me. I have no need to know the etymology of a word to use it correctly. I do not need to have any knowledge of egg production to make an omelette and I certainly have no need to know why 2+2=4 to make calculations. You can convince us that your colleague in the sermon/not-at-service example is correct merely by letting us know that he holds a contradiction to be false. You can do this because that’s all he needs: to hold that a contradiction is false. He doesn’t need to hold a particular meta-logic, or range of meta-logics, otherwise you would need to stipulate that he does so in the example.

Why, (if it is true etc.) do we need to “account” for logic, but precious little else? What is it to “account” for logic, and what does “accounting” for it actually do?

Take the law of non contradiction. If
1- it is true that there are no true contradictions and
2- I cannot “account” for 1
what follows? Are there, then, true contradictions?

However, from my perspective there is real trouble with employing this simple syllogism, as it eliminates other variables a priori, which are intrinsic to the facts, such as (from WCF Ch. 3 Para 1):
-“God is not the author of sin”;
-“nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures”;
-“nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away”.

I agree that logic is “derivative and reflective of the original uncreated logic of the eternal triune God”; however, that fact does not make logic unreliable as a basis for determining factual arguments. A failure to assess all of the relevant facts to a logical argument does not mean that the method of logic is thereby invalid.

Further, if we accept Van Til’s quote with regard to the power of a simple single syllogism to destroy the method of logic, then we have no defense against anti-inerrancy folks who claim that Biblical contradictions or inconsistencies are irreconcilable apart from categorizing them unhelpfully as “mystery” or “myth”.

I may not completely understand either, but I thought I’d mention that I picked up on that same flaw as well.

Please tell me how you determined that “moral responsibility” and “the full sovereignty of God” are contradictory. If they are not contradictory, how does “logic as we know it” demand that we must surrender one or the other?

>How so ?

>How does it follow that if the “logic we know” is the same as God’s logic, “we” end up with Aristotle’s God?

“Other writers go too far in the other direction when they argue that logic is a created thing, or that logic is man-made, or something along those lines.”

>Which writers would that be? I can’t get anyone to admit that Van Til or any of his followers hold that position, even when they are quoted supporting it.

“The relationship between the logic of God and logic as we know it, such as Aristotelian logic, is complex.”

>So you are saying that here are two logics. There the logic we know and the logic we don’t now and will never know. These two logics while totally different have some sort of relationship to each other. That relationship is complex.

“First, logic as we know it depends upon the original logic of God.”

>The logic we know depends on a different logic which we don’t now know and will never know. How do you know this? How can you possibly know anything about the logic of which you know nothing (the original logic)? If you can know nothing of this original logic, how can you know about its relationships to anything?

“Either God is our logic, or logic is our God.”

>Without the law of contradiction (part of logic as we know it ), God also means not God and logic also means not logic, so where is the problem? You have said nothing wrong or nothing right for that matter. The law of contradiction is part of logic as we know it, but may have nothing to do with the original uncreated logic about which we know nothing.

“Taking logic as we know it as ultimate is to mistake the analogue for the original”

>I am not sure what taking logic as “ultimate” means, but it must be very wrong to mistake something one knows for something about which one knows nothing at all. Apparently, it is far superior to hold something about which one knows nothing at all as ultimate.

 “If we are treating logic as the self-sufficient determiner of possibility, we’d have to surrender either moral responsibility or the full sovereignty of God. (See Rom 9:19ff.)”

>Even what you refer to as “logic as we know it” does not force us to surrender either the moral responsibility of man or the full sovereignty of God. These two things are not contradictory. Neither one stated as a proposition is the contradiction of the other. A third proposition must be added before any problem arises. That third proposition is that it would be wrong for God to foreordain all the acts of man and yet hold man responsible for them. This third proposition is believed, but not admitted to, by those who claim the first two propositions appear contradictory.

“The simple fact that Scripture won’t allow us to surrender either of these to the demands of logic is an indication that logic as we know it must be leading us astray somehow.”

>You are correct that Scripture won’t allow us to surrender either these propositions, but you are wrong that logic “as we know it” demands that we surrender one or the other.

“The way through such apparent difficulties, I think, is to understand logic as (3.1) derivative and reflective of the original uncreated logic of the eternal triune God, and to remember that [~(3.2)] we should not, therefore, take logic to be the independent determiner of possibility and believability, particularly when Scripture invites us not to.”

>Is the “logic” that is derivative and reflective created? Isn’t that going too far? You said as much earlier.

>Since we should throw out logic as the determiner of possibility and believability, should we simply give up any attempt o determine what is possible and believable? If not what should we use as the determiner?