Comments on: God, Propositions, and Necessary Existence

By: Brian Johnson

Brian Johnson — Fri, 01 Apr 2016 00:42:08 +0000

I wonder if propositions as speech act alters your assessment. If, prior to creation, God the Father ‘spoke’ to God the Son, would propositions exist?
I understand your argument as simply:
A: if nothing but God existed before creation
Then either propositions are equivalent to God, or propositions did not exist,
Propositions are not God,
Therefore propositions did not exist.
Is that correct?
It might be argued that God communicates with himself ( let us make man in our image) at least once prior to the creation of man ( which counters the idea that communication came into existence only for the sake of God/man relations), which leaves open the idea that, if propositions exist because communication (speech acts) exist, then as God communes with Himself necessarily (apropos of being ‘Triune’), then propositions exist necessarily.
Granted, we don’t have to call the inter-trinitarian communication propositional in nature/form, but I cannot see why we necessarily cannot consider it as such.
I am not claiming Plantinga argues for this, but I can see it supporting his thesis.

By: Jimmy Jose

Jimmy Jose — Thu, 30 Apr 2015 13:22:45 +0000

Dear James,

I am sorry, but I could not follow how you justify “non propositional knowledge”… Please help…. And also if language is representational and cannot communicate any literal / real Truth… Then knowledge through language seems impossible… And Scriptural revelation thus seems incaplble of communicating any truth…. Due to infinite regress of representation’s….

Also propositions are descriptions of reality not creation of reality… Why is a. Description/ proposition then necessary to exist….

Sorry for typos and any blunders in reasoning… Clarification would be greatly appreciated…

Regards,
Jimmy.

By: joe pipkorn

joe pipkorn — Wed, 22 Apr 2015 23:24:22 +0000

Howdy James,

If propositions–all possible propositions–have eternally been in the mind of God (as seems to be implied by His omniscience), and if God exists necesarryinecesarry in all possible worlds, would not the propositions which constitute His mind exist in those worlds as well? Perhaps I am confused and haven’t understood the point…IsuspectI that I am. Anyway, any help you could give that would point me in the right direction would be appreciated. I’m relatively new to all this. 🙂

By: James Baird

James Baird — Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:50:26 +0000

In reply to Christopher Lee.

Hi Chris,

Thanks for your comment.

By “pre-theoretical intuitions” I just mean how things seem to us on a commonsense level.

I have given the modality of propositions some thought from transcendental perspective in the Van Tilian sense, if that is what you mean. In fact, it was my study of Van Til that motivated this paper.

We know that 7+5=12 is a reflection of God’s ontology, yes. This follows from it being created, since all creation is a reflection of God’s ontology. But is 7+5=12 a *necessary* reflection of God’s character? That is hard to say. Dr. Poythress says that it is in his new book on mathematics, but he also says that we should not be dogmatic on this point. Rather we should be very humble. What my paper is trying to do is support this type of modal humility. If Plantinga was right in saying that the proposition *7+5=12* exists in every possible world, God could then not create a world where *7+5=12* was false, because, according to Plantinga, *7+5=12* is true in every possible world in which it exists. Therefore, I critiqued Plantinga’s argument for the necessary existence of propositions in order to take a step toward validating the kind of modal humility Dr. Poythress is displaying.

As to your last point: Yes, *God exists in the ontological Trinity* is a proposition, and it is indeed a contingently existing proposition, on my view. But we must keep in mind the representational nature of propositions. Propositions reflect reality, but they are not identical with the realities they reflect. *God exists in the ontological Trinity* is a proposition, but it is not identical with God’s existing in the ontological trinity—it rather represents God’s exiting in the ontological Trinity in a way that allows us to think and talk about God’s ontology. So, by saying that the proposition *God exists in the ontological Trinity* exists contingently, I am not saying that *God* exists in the ontological Trinity cogently, but rather that the *proposition* that represents God’s exiting in the ontological Trinity contingently exists. God, of course, is eternally existence in three Persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

I hope this helps clear things up.

I had to write this fast, so I apologize for any typos.

Best,
James

By: James Baird

James Baird — Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:07:19 +0000

In reply to James Baird. Please excuse the typos.

By: James Baird

James Baird — Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:06:24 +0000

In reply to Joel Carini.

Hi Joel,

Thanks for your comment. I really appreciate it. I am very glad that the two responses that have thus far been given are both regarding Plantinga’s view of propositions (which I hold to with a substantial amount of revisions) and not my argument against Plantinga per se.

I hope I can do your reflections on my paper justice in the short amount of time I have to respond to it. If I do not, I am very sorry, and I hope I can do a better job in the future.

It seems to me that your comment is an attempt to propose an alternate understanding of propositions to Plantinga’s that is compatible both with it being true that “God exists” before God created and compatible with creatio ex nihilo. I appreciate this project a lot—unfortunately, I think your particular way of running it cannot get off the ground.

To strike at the heart of your proposal, I would simply ask: How can a relation which cannot exist be a true statement? You say that a proposition is “a statement about things,” “the sort of thing which can be said to be true or false,” “a relation,” and “not the sort of thing that can be said to exist or not to exist.” But this just seems to me to be a confusion of ontological categories. (Also, in your second to last paragraph you seem to confuse what a proposition says about Joel’s existing with what a proposition is. Joel’s existing might be a relation between Joel and existence [if you’re a Thomist], but the proposition “Joel exists” is not this relation—it is a statement about this relation.)

To respond to your objection: Yes, if propositions exist, then there are an infinite number of them. Why is this a problem? It would be a problem if propositions where concrete things, like tables and chairs. Then we would run into any number of paradoxes, like Hilbert’s Hotel. But propositions are not concrete, they are abstract, like numbers. We do not have a problem admitting that an infinite amount of numbers exist—why should we be worried about an infinite number of propositions?

I think there are quite a lot of good reasons to attribute existence to propositions. For one, propositions are real things in the world (we use them every day, after all, and in a much different way than we use imaginary unicorns), and real things exist. This seems to me to be reason enough.

Why worry about whether or not the proposition “God exists” was true before creation? God did, in fact, exist—no one here doubts that—there was just no created proposition that corresponded to his existence in eternity past. We could accept this proposal without changing an ounce of orthodox theology proper. That seems to be a good deal, if you ask me.

Best,
James

By: Joel Carini

Joel Carini — Mon, 20 Apr 2015 15:01:22 +0000

Hey, James! Nice synthesis of theological commitment and philosophical thought. However, I’m quite confident that before the world existed, it was true that, “God exists.” Before God created the world, he existed, and he alone. If God and only God existed, then it was true that, “God exists,” and that, “Only God exists.” For that to be the case, why would it also be necessary that other things, propositions, exist? If nothing existed, why would there need to be propositions that exist in order for it to be true that, “nothing exists?”
In short, the sense in which propositions can be said to exist seems to be utterly equivocal with the sense in which concrete objects can be said to exist. A proposition is not a concrete object but a statement about things, including concrete objects.
Compare propositions to unicorns. It makes sense to speak of unicorns existing, however, unicorns do not exist. Unicorns are the sort of the thing which could exist. But unicorns do not matter to our lives in the way that, for example, horses do. Now propositions do matter to our lives, in a different way than horses do, of course, but unlike unicorns. We might speak of propositions “existing” because they are reasonable topics of conversation, having an impact upon our lives, whereas unicorns do not have that sort of impact. To sum it up, horses exist, and unicorns do not, though unicorns are the sort of thing that could exist, while propositions, not being the sort of thing which could exist, cannot properly be said to exist, but only equivocally.
On another note, if every proposition existed, wouldn’t an infinite number of propositions exist? But how could a numerically infinite number of things exist? Wouldn’t an enormous number of false propositions exist, even ones concerning things which God hardly imagined bringing into existence?
There seem to be a number of reasons not to attribute existence to propositions, and I don’t see any reason to attribute existence proper to propositions. But if propositions aren’t even the sort of things which could properly exist, then this problem goes away.
What then are propositions? And how could they exist in this equivocal way without any minds thinking them? Or do they exist equivocally only because God thinks them all? Let’s start with truths about existing objects. “Joel exists.” For God to bring that about, he has to give existence to the human being “Joel” he has conceived. (Does he then also have to give existence to a proposition, “Joel exists?” What if he doesn’t? Does Joel exist, but “Joel exists” doesn’t exist? But “Joel exists” is obviously true, so how could the proposition not exist but be true?) It is then, in the same act, true that, “Joel exists,” without God giving existence to any additional (abstract) object. The truth of the proposition depends on the existence of Joel alone; it does not depend on the existence or non-existence of a proposition. Propositions are the sort of thing which can be said to be true or false, not the sort of the thing that can be said to exist or not to exist.
But the question remains: What is a proposition? A proposition appears to be a formal relation, not an additional existing thing, but a relation between things. “Joel” is a potential particular human being essence which God has conceived; existence is whatever existence is. “Joel exists,” says that “Joel” has come into contact with “existence,” and thus, he exists. The proposition is a relation between things. It is the sort of thing which a mind can think, but it is true apart from any mind thinking it. The relation is real, even if it is not thought about.
How’s that? A proposition is a relation. The proposition, “God exists,” was true when God alone existed.

By: Christopher Lee

Christopher Lee — Sun, 19 Apr 2015 03:52:02 +0000

Hi James
Very intriguing article.

Could you explain what you mean by “pre-theoretical intuition”?
I have an idea of what you mean, but I wanted to confirm with you.

Also, I appreciate your attempts to understand and explain Plantinga’s utilization of modal logic regarding the necessity vs contingency of propositions.

Have you considered this issue from a more external perspective? Specifically what I am getting at is: have you had the opportunity to think through this issue of contingent vs necessary propositions from a transcendental perspective?

Part of the reason why I ask is that I dont know that I completely agree with your formulation of regarding 7+5 =12. I certainly agree with you that 7+5=12 is not numerically identical with God, but I feel that that mathematical proposition can be understood differently in relation to God from a transcendental perspective as opposed to the modal logic perspective.

Is 7+5=12 contingent? I think I would agree but it seems like I would take it from a slightly different vantage point.
From a consistent trasncendental understanding, we know that 7+5=12 is a reflection of God’s ontological nature. God’s nature does not change. Therefore, he could not have created this world any other way since his creation is a reflection of his unchanging nature.
But of course, God was free to not create this world and therefore free to not reflect his unchanging ontological nature (7+5=12) in creation (since it was not necessary for him to create. So this seems to take a different angle from your reasoning as to why that proposition is contingent.)

Anyway, just a rambling thought.

So, you mentioned that all propositions are contingent.
Would this be a proposition: God exists in the ontological trinity.
If so, why is this contingent?

What am I missing?
Thanks.

Chris Lee