I gave examples of assumptions we all make — cheaper is better, faster is better. You may find a philosophical root for these, but I’m not sure why that’s important. Is philosophy the great decoder ring?

Hermonta

Hermonta

Lots of need for reigning in the movement, it seems to me.

Is it just me, or is Camden like a hairless Len Casper, WGN-TV announcer for the Chicago Cubs? Similar vocal inflections…kinda looks like him too.

Sorry to be so severely off topic.

If worldviews are made up of broad, uncritical and unchallenged assumptions, they can be dealt with in broad strokes, without philosophical rigor; to expect philosophical rigor is to show up with the wrong tools. My thought is just to pull away from the idea that “without philosophical rigor” means “weak” or “incomplete” or “ineffective” or “naïve” or whatever. It means none of those things; it just means “without philosophical rigor.” Poythress, for example, is a very knowledgeable, seasoned scholar. I believe that as such he is in just the right position to address pervasive but uncritical worldview-like commitments persuasively, effectively, and in a way that challenges but edifies. That is a tall order, no less demanding (maybe more) than most rigorous philosophy out there, in my view. In other words, “that’s not philosophy” is fine with me; “but it should be” goes too far.

It may be the case that there are worldview guys who call themselves philosophers. Assuming there are more non-worldview guys who call themselves philosophers than the worldview guys who do so, the worldview guys would be the minority, and so less entitled to the sought-after moniker. That seems clear enough; so maybe that would be misleading, but I’m not sure it’s worth worrying about.
Thanks

(Further details: One way worldview writers—among others—do this is by invoke binary categories that purport to capture every possible relevant view, where one category (our category) is the true, the other category the false. Then, these writers sort the views they disagree with—materialism, naturalism, scientism, physicalism, reductionism, whatever is relevant—into the latter category, and treat that as an argument against those views. Not that Poythress does this (I haven’t read the book yet), but just sorting criticisms of inerrancy into the “impersonalistic” category is not by itself an argument against those criticisms or views. It is a conclusion of an argument at best.)

As to your second, why should anyone have to “do philosophy” or “address actual philosophers”? One may either address folk worldviews (to a folk audience/readership), or, if you like, you can address “actual [versus virtual, or merely possible–do ‘possible philosophers’ exist necessarily??] philosophers,” but I don’t see any standing requirement to subject one’s self to the often futile minutae of “actual philosophy.” You can say very significant things and influential things–make an apologetic, answer a widely held claim (even one widely held among “actual philosophers”) without being bothered by that stuff. In short, I’m not sure why “actual philosophers” have entered the discussion here. Poythress hasn’t said he’s written a philosophical book on philosophy for philosophers, so no worry in that sense.

The first is empirical. Do people really have worldviews? Or, to what extend do they have them? What’s the evidence for this? Sure, many (all?) people have, at some times, some beliefs or attitudes about basic issues like god’s existence, some applied ethical issues, and the like. But where’s the evidence for thinking the folk even have basic views on matters epistemological (or the like)? Anecdotally, from teaching some large philosophy classes and taking regular surveys etc., most people do not (or do not seem to) have many of the “presuppositions” that worldview writers often suppose they have. Take even the often claimed moral or global relativism of the folk in the US, say. That does seem to be the default view for many people, yet many people do not hold it consistently (then again, we need more empirical work on this issue. Further, some major studies on the beliefs of professional philosophers, such as the philsurvey, suggest that a good proportion do not have views on most parts of the “worldview”).

The second worry is more substantive. Worldview works often seem like an excuse to never move beyond (sometimes sub-) intro level philosophy. What I mean is, worldview writing often seems to superficially discuss and critique (what they assume are the) folk worldviews, like relativism, and from there infer the truth of Christianity. It is a sort of way of pretending to do philosophy and make an apologetic without ever having to actually address actual philosophers. Granted, this does not characterize all worldview writing.